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MONTH: May 2007 Books for animal people
The Moral Menagerie: Philosophy and Animal Rightsby Marc R. Fellenz
Marc Fellenz, a philosophy teacher at
Suffolk County Community College in New York, writes from a broader and
deeper perspective than is typical in debates over animal rights theory.
Reviewing the major animal rights theories, Fellenz fails to find any
that lack significant shortcomings. He goes on to look for a better intellectual
basis on which to ground an ethical theory on behalf of animals. Fellenz rejects Peter Singer's utilitarianism
because one cannot weigh the benefits of most activities against the costs
with any precision. Tom Regan's deontological rights-based
theory is based upon sentience, Fellenz points out, and since sentience
exists along a continuum, no one knows where the arbitrary lines of exclusion
should be drawn. The Aristotelian ethic of emphasising
the moral virtue of the human, rather than the moral effect of the activity,
also fails to indicate where the virtuous line in our dealings with animals
should be drawn. The theory that society and ethics are
based upon a social contract, to avoid perpetual warfare, is not easily
applied to human/animal relations, because humans usually have nothing
to gain by voluntarily refraining from exploiting animals. Fellenz terms all of these approaches
"extensionist" i.e. seeking to inappropriately extend human
constructs to the animal world. An environmental ethic, Fellenz claims,
would "do more than establish a ground for our moral obligations
to nature; it would risk making the natural world so sacrosanct that humanity's
very presence in it cannot avoid being morally objectionable." Fellenz compares the theoretical constructs
for animal rights to the theories behind deep ecology and ecofeminism.
Deep ecology and ecofeminism each provide a logical and compelling moral
basis, Fellenz believes, for undermining the narrow anthropocentrism which
contaminates traditional moral philosophy, and allow us to deal realistically
with non-human animals. Fellenz quotes John Berger's apt description
of a zoo as an "epitaph--a monument to the permanent marginization
of animals and a concession that authentic wildness is itself an endangered
species. As wilderness and our access to it continue to shrink,"
Berger continued, "we may have little choice but to rely upon such
impoverished and self defeating devices as the game farm and zoo to preserve
the memory of the very existence of the animals' world 'Wildlife management'
is thus an oxymoron, for if it has to be managed it is not truly wild." Some of Fellenz's statements in regard
to hunting may raise a sceptical eyebrow. For example, Fellenz writes,
"it is telling that while the humane animal advocate feels compassion
for the suffering animal it may be the hunter who truly befriends the
animal, and heeds its call." Some humans enjoy escaping the stultifying
self- domestication that we call civilization through sport hunting, but
to suggest that by taking up predation a person can actually "befriend"
his victims is to make a claim at odds with the reality that wild predators
usually do not kill and eat their friends, and do not hang their heads
on the wall. Like most philosophers, Fellenz seems
to have little feeling for animals, and little direct experience with
them. Extending sympathy and understanding to non-humans should not be
rejected as "extensionist'" when those who do this know that
it elicits the same responses from many animals, including wildlife, as
from humans in need of care. But such experience has little meaning
to moral philosophers. Instead, Fellenz provides a fascinating summation
of the philosophy of hunting and other ritualized or institutionalized
forms of animal abuse, citing parallels with sacrifice and totemism. There
are disquieting similarities between the ancient high priests, with their
knives and sacrificial altars, and the hunters and vivisectors with their
knives and guns, likewise eager to sacrifice animals for their gods, now
named "conservation" or "science." Just as guilt about killing was in ancient
times expiated by collective rituals and a professed totemic kinship with
animals, so contemporary hunters deceive themselves by ritually reciting
that they are "lovers of nature'" who are "keeping down
the numbers'" or "removing problem animals'" or "investing
money in the Third World." Vivisectors have a parallel ritualistic
vocabulary. From their own perspective, what they do is "sacrifice"
individual animals for the perceived greater good of society. This book will not easily be understood
by readers who are not already familiar with animal rights theory. But
for those who can endure the turgid prose, the dense text and the multisyllabic
philosophisms, the rewards are great. There is wisdom on every page, even
if the book groans under the weight of it.--Chris Mercer Whalewatcher:
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